870ff095d8
Rootless podman migration (TASK-11): - Remove sudo from all podman calls in PodmanClient + 8 backend files - Remove sudo from all podman/docker calls in deploy script - Restore full systemd security hardening: NoNewPrivileges, RestrictAddressFamilies, MemoryDenyWriteExecute, RestrictRealtime, RestrictNamespaces, RestrictSUIDSGID, SystemCallFilter, ProtectSystem=strict - Enable loginctl linger for rootless container persistence - Remove Ollama from auto-deploy (marketplace-only) Session & auth hardening: - Increase MAX_CONCURRENT_SESSIONS 20→50 (prevents eviction storms) - Debounced 401 redirect in rpc-client.ts (prevents redirect storms) Boot stability: - optimize-debian.sh: adds chrony, swap, removes policy-rc.d - deploy script: pre-restart chrony + swap setup - ISO build: chrony package, swap file creation - BootScreen: no longer clears localStorage (prevents splash replay) - RootRedirect: sole owner of localStorage clearing on server ready UI fixes: - Sidebar opacity default changed from 0→visible (fixes missing sidebar after page-persistence login without entrance animation) - Console.log/error wrapped in import.meta.env.DEV guards - Remove unused route import from RootRedirect Beta tracking: - CLAUDE.md: beta freeze protocol added - MASTER_PLAN.md: TASK-11, TASK-17, phase structure - BETA-PROGRESS.md: initial tracking doc - Tagged v1.2.0-alpha.1 as pre-rootless baseline Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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SSRF Analysis Complete
Found 5 SSRF vulnerabilities across the Archipelago backend:
Critical (2)
- SSRF-001:
backup.upload-s3— user-suppliedendpointURL passed directly toreqwestPUT with zero validation. Can reach any internal service (Bitcoin RPC, LND, Grafana). Response status + partial body leaked in errors. - SSRF-002:
backup.download-s3— same pattern but GET, with full response body saved to disk and retrievable via backup APIs. Most dangerous finding — enables complete exfiltration of any internal HTTP endpoint.
High (1)
- SSRF-003:
identity.resolve-name(NIP-05) — user-controlleddomaininuser@domainidentifier causes HTTPS GET to arbitrary domain. HTTPS-only limits impact but enables DNS rebinding, IP disclosure, and partial response exfiltration.
Medium (1)
- SSRF-004:
content.download-peer/content.browse-peer— weak.onionvalidation (suffix check only vs. strict 56-char base32 innode_message.rs). Mitigated by Tor SOCKS proxy which rejects invalid addresses, but defense-in-depth failure.
Low (1)
- SSRF-005:
webhook.configure— private IP validation exists but bypassed in dev mode, missing0.0.0.0, no DNS rebinding protection, no redirect protection.
Report written to loop/pentest/analysis/ssrf.md.